ganda blow. Not only would a "free" Eastern Europe thus prevent the Soviet Union from using its resources; it would move toward Western Europe, eventually adding these resources to the Western bloc.1
The concept of the national interest is not an easy one with which to work.2 However, it is generally accepted that it is in the interest of all the people and the government of the United States to avoid a thermonuclear war; there is somewhat less consensus on the proposition that the term also includes foiling any significant threat to the territorial integrity, economic prosperity, and social unity of the United States. This study defines the American national interest in terms of these two broad objectives. Applying them to Eastern Europe yields fairly straightforward results. Nothing in the area seems likely to threaten, or even affect, the territorial integrity, economic prosperity, or social unity of the United States; therefore the major American national interest in Eastern Europe is the prevention of thermonuclear war.
There is certainly nothing unusual in this argument; apparently it was the reason why American officials decided not to intervene in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, the argument can be pushed one step further to suggest that, if the American national interest in Eastern Europe is the prevention of thermonuclear war, then it is also in the American national interest to maintain tight Soviet control of Eastern Europe.
This arguiment, in turn, is based upon assumptions about (i) the condition of Eastern Europe without such control and (2) the likely reaction of outside states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, to such a condition.
Each set of assumptions must be set forth and examined in greater detail.
INSTABILITY OF EASTERN EUROPE
Removal of Soviet control would allow many of the festering international disputes among the Eastern European states to develop fully. These primarily concern disputed territory, such as Macedonia (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece), Transylvania (Hungary and Rumania), Northern Epirus (Greece and Albania), Kosmet (Albania and Yugoslavia), Dobruja (Bulgaria and Rumania), Eastern Thrace (Bulgaria and Turkey), and Western Thrace (Bulgaria and Greece). These are all in the southern part of the area, but several of the northern states have unresolved territorial disputes with the Soviet Union over Bessarabia and I It is true that recent research into the contemporary political systems of Eastern Europe suggests that they have some basis of support other than the Soviet army and that therefore, by implication, the moral case against them may not be as strong as many Americans have Pious hopes that such outmoded internal divisions will disappear seem confounded by their reappearance in Western Europe and North America, and there is good theoretical reason to believe that economic development, particularly in its later stages, tends to increase rather than decrease the importance of such divisions.3 The impact of a Soviet withdrawal on this kind of problem may be seen during both the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian revolts. In 1956
Czechoslovakia and Rumania took stern measures to prevent their Hungarian minorities from being "infected" with the plague from Budapest, and even Yugoslavia showed concern. The Kadar government had to loudly disclaim any irredentist goals after Warsaw Pact troops had placed it in power. During the few months of civil liberties in Czechoslovakia in 1968 there was a good deal of conflict between the Hungarian minority and the Slovaks about the new constitution that was being drafted.4
These problems of national division might be overcome by agreement on a set of governing institutions in each country. Unfortunately the institutions of Eastern Europe have been copied from and imposed by the Soviet Union; they would almost certainly have to be changed significantly. Of course the overthrow of government following the departure of a colonial power is hardly novel.
But Soviet control has also deprived these countries of the resource used, with varying success, to bridge the gap of legitimacy from old to new institutions:
the charismatic leader with a national political base. It is striking that Nagy and Dubcek seemed cut from the same cloth-good but colorless men who developed no particular personal support aside from their roles as symbols of resistance to the Soviet Union. Therefore the only way in which a new leader could gain support would be to appeal to the very ethnic groups that threaten internal stability.
3 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass., 1966) , pp.
123-164.
Actually these three kinds of problems can be separated only analytically; in practice they reinforce one another. Thus, Eastern Europe without Soviet control would be a series of states torn by internal conflicts over governmental institutions and competing nationality groups, with a large number of possible points of external conflict, ruled by leaders with no national constituency or legitimacy.
Some recent empirical research tentatively supports the intuitively plausible notions that political leaders in such a situation are likely to exacerbate international tensions to create internal unity and that the same governments are easily weakened by intense international conflict.5 Moreover, in conflicts between such weak forces, there is a strong incentive for the participants to involve outside powers.6
But this is only half of the argument. Even if this set of assumptions is accepted, it is still not clear why this instability is a threat to the American national interest. Experience with decolonization suggests that instability is a common phenomenon; this may increase our confidence that it will occur, but it leaves unanswered the question of why none of these experiences has yet (At least the Middle East is vital only to the West.) In terms of location, it has served as an invasion corridor in both directions for the past thousand years.
Most of the Communist governments of the world are contained within its borders, and their downfall would certainly be a shock to the Soviet Union. It has ethnic ties with the areas of both sides, and it is potentially a major industrial center. All of this might not matter if it were controlled by a group of stable, neutral governments such as Austria or Finland, but this is unlikely. It is the combination of perceived importance and internal instability that makes outside intervention so likely.
The second assumption, then, is that the Soviet Union or Western Europe would eventually succumb to the temptation to intervene in the internal quar- West Germany finds it difficult to remain out of the conflict and covertly allows volunteers to go to East Germany. This in turn leads to an ultimatum from the Soviet Union to West Germany, which forces the United States to take a strong stand.
The point is not the likelihood of this particular sequence of events; rather, something like it seems an almost inevitable result of a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Given the consequently higher risk of thermonuclear war, such an action does not seem to be in the American national interest. 
